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Abstract- The most common malware detection approaches 
which are based on signature matching and are not sufficient 
for metamorphic malware detection, since virus kits and 
metamorphic engines can produce variants with no 
resemblance to one another. Metamorphism provides an 
efficient way for eluding malware detection software kits. 
Code obfuscation methods like dead-code insertion are also 
widely used in metamorphic malware. In order to address 
the problem of detecting mutated generations, we propose a 
method based on Opcode Graph Similarity (OGS). OGS 
tries to detect metamorphic malware using the similarity of 
opcode graphs. In this method, all nodes and edges have a 
respective effect on classification, but in the proposed 
method, edges of graphs are pruned using Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA). LDA is based on the concept 
of searching for a linear combination of predictors that best 
separates two or more classes. Most distinctive edges are 
identified with LDA and the rest of edges are removed. The 
metamorphic malware families considered here are NGVCK 
and metamorphic worms that we denote these worms as 
MWOR. The results show that our approach is capable of 
classifying metamorphosed instances with no or minimum 
false alarms. Also, our proposed method can detect NGVCK 
and MWOR with high accuracy rate. 
Keywords-metamorphic malware; virus detection; linear 
discriminant analysis; opcode graph similarity; 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today malware and viruses are serious problems for 
governments, organizations and individuals. Malware 
refers to software designed specifically to damage or 
disrupt a system [2]. A metamorphic malware is one that 
can transform based on the ability to translate, edit and 
rewrite its own code. Metamorphism is the process of 
transforming a piece of code into unique instances [1]. In 
metamorphic malware, copies of the instances are 
functionally equivalent, but their internal structures and 
source codes differ. This ability allows new variants to 
evade detection. 
Signature scanning has been largely used as an 
antivirus technique. Current anti-viruses (A V) fail to detect 
metamorphic malware due to their varied internal 
structures. As mal ware writers are aware of the popularity 
of signature based A V, they have invented several 
techniques to evade signature-based detection [3]. These 
transformations include register renaming, code 
permutation, dead code insertion and block dead code 
insertion. 
Metamorphic mal ware is considered more difficult to 
write than other malware such as polymorphic. In order to 
ease this difficulty, mal ware writers have developed virus 
creation kits. One of the most famous virus kits is "Next 
Generation Virus Creation Kit" (NGVCK) [5]. It can 
automatically generate new variants of a virus with the 
same behavior. 
Many methods have been proposed to detect 
metamorphic viruses, which can be categorized into two 
families: those that use dynamic analysis and those that 
rely on static analysis of the code. [2]. Dynamic analysis 
refers to observing a malware's behavior during run-time 
while static analysis is the testing and evaluation of a 
malware by examining the code without executing it. 
Dynamic analysis is costly and needs an isolated 
environment to perform. Furthermore, it suffers from 
incomplete code coverage because it monitors only one 
execution path while static analysis covers all part of a file. 
In this study, we propose a method based on static analysis 
and similarity method. 
In this paper, we investigate on the method proposed 
by Runwall et al. in [4]. In basic Opcode Graph Similarity 
(OGS) all nodes and edges contribute to the final result. 
Therefore, this approach is not immune against code 
obfuscation like dead code insertion. To address this 
problem, we combine the proposed method by Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) in order to prune dead codes 
from the graphs. Also, we used a more precise criterion to 
set a threshold. The results are promising and show high 
accuracy rate for detection of NGVCK and MWOR [6] 
metamorphic mal ware. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, related 
works are reviewed. In section 3 background information 
for the proposed method is provided. Then in the next 
section we present our methodology. In section 5, we 
illustrate our experimental result on NGVCK and MWOR. 
Section 6 discusses different aspects of proposed method. 
Finally section 7 contains our conclusion. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Prior research in [7] developed a statistical method for 
metamorphic mal ware detection using Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM). The main idea was to train an HMM with 
opcodes extracted from viruses of a metamorphic family. 
The trained HMM will model the characteristics of a 
metamorphic virus. With this solution, it would be possible 
to calculate a score representing how close a file is to a 
virus family given by the trained HMM. Also, they 
revealed that NGVCK has the highest rate of obfuscation 
comparing with other metamorphism engines. In [8], 
authors proposed a method based on Profile HMM 
(PHMM) for metamorphic detection. A low detection rate 
was achieved for NGVCK but VCL-32 and PS-MPC 
detection rates were acceptable. Ref. [9] has studied on 
more obfuscated metamorphic malware and evaded HMM 
detector by inserting dead code of benign files to malware 
ones which resulted in poor accuracy. To tackle this 
problem, authors in [lO] published a method based on 
statistical techniques which improved HMM in 
combination with Chi-squared test. 
Many efforts have been made in accordance with 
malware detection by using graph analysis. Reference [11] 
proposes a graph-based method for mal ware detection. It 
extracts the sequence of opcodes and builds a weighted 
directed graph where each opcode is a node of the graph. 
Authors of [4] tried to improve the last method of 
metamorphic detection using Opcode Graph Similarity 
(OGS) and could obtain a high accuracy rate for NGVCK 
detection which was comparable to HMM detection rate. 
Researchers have published a metamorphic worm in 
[12]. This malware is highly obfuscated and it can easily 
evade HMM and OGS. What distinguishes this 
metmorphic mal ware from the others is that it can carry its 
own morphing engine. Authors in [13] used LDA and data 
mining methods for metamorphic malware detection. 
Using LDA, they could rank opcode bi-gram features for 
classifying benign and mal ware files. The accuracy rate for 
NGVCK was about 99.7%. 
In overall, prior researches are based on similarity 
methods and prone to elusion because they do not provide 
clear solution for encountering code obfuscation such as 
dead-code insertion. 
III. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
A. Linear Discriminant Analysis 
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) is a method used 
in many fields such as machine learning and pattern 
recognition for extracting features which preserve class 
separability. LDA is based upon the concept of searching 
for a linear combination of predictors that best separates 
two or more classes. Using LDA, features are selected 
based on the ratio of the total within-class variability and 
between-class variances. Within-class scatter matrix Sw is 
computed by (1): 
c 
Sw = L PkSi (1) i= l  
C denotes the number of classes. In our problem, it 
would be 2 because there are two classes, i.e. Malware 
and Benign. Pk is the probability for class k and is 
considered 0.5 in this paper. Sjis the vanance of the 
features and computed as follows (2): 
n 
Sj 
= L (x - mi)(x - maT 
XEDi 
(2) 
Here miis the mean vector, x is the value of each 
feature and Si is the resulting scatter matrix of the ith 
class. Between-class variability matrix SBis computed by 
the (3) as follow: 
C 
SB = L NJmi - m)(mi - m? (3) 
i= l  
In (3)m is the overall mean, and mj and Njare the 
sample mean and sizes of the classes, respectively. It can 
be clearly seen that between-class variability is computed 
by variance of class centers with respect to global center. 
B. Opcode Graph Similarity 
This method was introduced in [4]. It is based on a 
graph-based technique that was used in [14]. In this 
approach authors try to make a weighted directed graph 
from opcodes of binary files. Each distinct opcode is a 
node in a directed graph. For each transition between 
opcode nodes, a weighted directed edge is added. Edge 
weights are the transition probabilities. The dissimilarity 
score of A and B opcode graphs is computed as follows: 
(N-1 )2 
Score (A, 8) =
 :2 .L laij - bijl 
!,)=o 
(4) 
Experiments indicate that mal ware graphs are more 
similar and they are different from benign graphs. 
Therefore, it is possible to set a threshold to distinguish 
malware and benign programs. 
IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
Fig. 1 summarizes the proposed methodology. The 
main goal here is to improve the opcode graph similarity 
method with the aid of LDA. With regard to OGS 
technique, it is needed to make graphs from opcodes and 
compare the graphs in order to determine whether the input 
file belongs to the metamorphic family or not. In the 
following section, the proposed approach is described. 
A. Preprocessing 
In the first step we need to prepare our dataset. As 
mentioned before, our method is based on static analysis, 
so it is needed to extract opcode sequences of files. For 
extracting opcodes, each file should be converted to the 
machine instructions. We used IDA Pro [15] for this 
purpose. Operands in machine instructions do not have an 
important role, so we omitted them. Then, the dataset is 
divided into training and validation sets. In this study, 
k-cross-fold validation is used [16]. 
B. Training 
As mentioned before, in OGS, all edges and nodes play 
a respective part in the outcome. One of the most popular 
obfuscation techniques used in metamorphic mal ware is 
dead-code insertion; therefore, dead-code would be part of 
graphs and edges. It could lead to false alarms in OGS. 
According to [6], OGS is unable to distinguish high 
obfuscated metamorphic worms from benign programs. 
Hence, the main goal of this step is removing dead-code 
and junk edges from graphs. 
In section 3, it was shown that LDA could calculate 
within and between variance of features. Our features here 
are edges and their weights. If we could find edges that 
have less within-class scatter and more between-class 
variability, then they would be good candidates to remain 
in the graph. Best edges are kept and the rest of them will 
be pruned. 
In order to perform this process, all distinct edges and 
their weights should be extracted. Then, within and 
between scatterings of each edge are calculated. To fmd 
most effective edges, Eq (5) is used. We ranks edges in 
descending order based on the following 
Re value.Definitely low rank edges should be removed. 
So, with the aid of the threshold, most effective features 
are ready to be used. 
5w + 5B 
Re = ----5w 
(5) 
Now the distinctive edges are ready and the graphs will 
be pruned. In other words, all edges are removed from a 
graph except distinctive edges. With this technique, 
mal ware files would be more similar to each other because 
their garbage codes were removed and also differ from 
benign programs. Consequently, setting a discriminative 
threshold is more affordable. 
C. Set Treshold 
The first and most important task in this phase is using 
distinctive edges in comparisons. A threshold can separate 
benign and metamorphic mal ware programs. In order to 
set a threshold, all pairs of training mal ware files should 
be compared with each other using Eq. (4) with regard to 
the distinctive edges. Afterwards, all training benign files 
are compared with all pairs of mal ware files. It is a strict 
and precise measure to confirm that all benign and 
malware files are sharply distinguished. In previous works 
such as [4] only adjacent files were compared. At the end 
of this step, there is a threshold that can distinguish 
malware and benign files. Now, the trained model is ready 
for use. In conclusion, in the trained model, malware files 
are similar and benign files are different from mal ware 
programs. Therefore, a threshold can differentiate them. 
D. Prediction 
The last step of the proposed method is prediction. All 
newly entered benign and malware files in the test set are 
compared with the malware files in the trained model. It is 
expected that input mal ware be similar to the instances in 
trained model and stand under the threshold. Conversely, 
benign programs should stand above the threshold, and any 
threshold violation leads to false alarms. 
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Figure I. Flow of proposed method 
V. EVALUATIONS 
Improved OGS was implemented in Python and C 
programming languages. We conducted all the 
experiments on platform having 4 GB RAM and Core i5-
M460@2.53 GHz processor and the operating system was 
64-bit Windows 7. In the following section, we will 
discuss the experimental results. 
A. Dataset 
The metamorphic mal ware families considered here 
are NGVCK [5] and worms developed in [6] and we 
denote these worms as MWOR. MWOR uses different 
methods for obfuscation. Dead-code insertion from benign 
files is widely used in MWOR. The authors of [6] define 
the ratio of dead-code to worm-code as the "padding­
ratio". For example a padding ratio of 2 indicates that a 
worm has twice as much dead-code as worm instructions. 
Our dataset consists of 200 NGVCK malware and 40 
benign files from Cygwin utility [17]. A wide variety of 
metamorphic detection approaches have used this dataset 
[7, 8, 10]. Furthermore, in [7], these malware files are 
shown to be the most highly metamorphic viruses 
generated with malware kits. 
MWOR is a Linux-based malware; hence our benign 
files were selected form Linux operating system. It 
consists of 20 benign files. We used distinct set of 
MWOR files with padding ratios of 0.5, l.0, l.5, 2.0, 2.5, 
3.0, 3.5, and 4.0. Totally there are 800 MWOR worms. 
B. Evaluation 
There are 4 possible outcomes for detection. True 
Positive (TP) which is the number of infected files that are 
classified correctly, False Positive (FP) which is the 
number of benign files that are classified as malware. 
True Negative (TN) which is the number of benign files 
misclassified and False Negative (FN) which is the 
number of mal ware files that are classified as benign. The 
accuracy rate is the number of correct classification 
acquired divided by the total number of test files which is 
computed as follows: 
TP+TN 
Total Accuracy = ------­
TP + TN + FP + FN 
(6) 
In MWOR dataset there are 8 categories. In order to 
get a precise accuracy for each fold, (7) is used: 
Total Accuracy + ITPR 
Mean Fold Accuracy = 2 
N 
(7) 
We applied five-fold cross-validation in our 
experiments and used the mean of the accuracy values 
achieved from the folds, which is denoted as mean 
maximum accuracy (MMA) rate [10] and is computed as 
follows: 
5 
MMA = �L Accuracy; 
;=1 
(8) 
Where Total Accuracy;indicates the resulting accuracy 
of ith fold in cross-validation. 
C. Experimental results 
In this section we present the result of our experiments 
using an improved OGS detector. As mentioned before, 
we used 5-cross-validation for NGVCK where the data is 
divided into five equal subsets. Each fold has 160 
mal ware and 20 benign files for training and the rest of 
them are for the test. Fig. 2 shows the similarity score 
between malware-malware files and mal ware-benign files 
which are based on Eq (4) from a sample fold of training 
data. In this example the threshold is 8 and it can be 
clearly seen that both mal ware and benign files are 
classified correctly. 
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Figure 2. Similarity score for benign versus NGVCK 
50 
As mentioned, we compared our test data with all 
instances of training set. For example, for 40 mal ware 
samples in test set we conducted 6400 comparison 
between training set and test set and No threshold violation 
was found. Also, we conducted 3200 comparisons for 
benign files with metamorphic viruses in the training set 
and again the threshold was not violated. We repeated 
these steps for other folds and the same result achieved. 
Consequently, it can confirm that our proposed method is a 
strong approach for NGVCK detection. Table I illustrates 
the result of NGVCK detection for Improved OGS. 
Table I NGVCK detection results 
Fold Accuracy (percent) 
1 100 
2 100 
3 100 
4 100 
5 100 
MMA 100 
For MWOR we used two fold cross validation because 
there are 20 benign files and accurate result at least 10 files 
are needed for training phase. Therefore, 10 files from 
benign and 50 files from mal ware with padding ratio 0.5 
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Figure 3. Similarity score for benign versus MWOR 
Table II MWOR detection results 
Mean Fold False False 
Fold Accuracy Positive Negative 
(percent) 
I 99.07 0 0.01 
2 99.79 0.01 0.001 
MMA 99.43 
were selected for training. The rest of the mal ware used 
for test. Fig. 3 shows the similarity scores of the 
malware and benign training samples. According to this 
result, the threshold is considered 4. 
In another experiment which is denoted in Table II 
we compare test set data with random instances � 
training model. It can be clearly seen that with 
increasing obfuscation, the similarity of malware files be 
close to benign files. The total accuracy for this fold is 
about 99%. 
D. Discussion 
Fig. 4 illustrates the accuracy rate of NGVCK and 
MWOR detection for the proposed method and original 
OGS approach. This figure shows that the proposed 
enhancement on OGS approach (i.e. LDA opcode 
selection) was effective and the proposed approach is 
less vulnerable against detection of high metamorphic 
malware such as MWOR. 
In our experiments we showed that our method can 
effectively detect NGVCK and MWOR. There are some 
parameters which can be discussed. During the 
experiments, we maintained 50 most discriminative 
edges. In our complementary experiments on NGVCK 
we changed the number selected top edges. Table III 
shows the results of these experiments for NGVCK. 
The results show that FP and FN happens when 200 
edges are maintained. 
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Figure 4. Accuracy rate of the proposed method versus OGS for 
NGVSK viruses and MWOR worms 
Table III. No. of selected top edges vs. accuracy rate 
Top Edges Accuracv rate 
50 100 
100 100 
150 100 
200 99 
Table IV shows our approach and well-known 
methods and their results for metamorphic mal ware 
detection. Structural Entropy [21] is a strong method for 
MWOR detection but according the experimental result 
it cannot detect NGVCK successfully. This approach 
applies directly to binary files and structural entropy 
score depends on segment length and the number of 
segments. NGVCK tends to produce a lot of segments. 
Therefore, it is successful for NGVCK detection. In 
[22] Simple Substitution Distance (SSD) is proposed 
based on substitution cipher cryptanalysis. The result is 
not very promising for MWOR with high padding ratio 
although area under the curve (AUC) is quite well for 
lower padding ratio. 
Table IV Comparison between well-known methods for NGVCK 
and MWOR detection and the proposed approach 
Method NGVCK MWOR 
Proposed Method ./ ./ 
OGS ./ x 
Structural Entropy x ./ 
HMM ./ x 
SSD ./ x 
In [19] authors illustrate that OGS is a reliable 
method for Javascript metamorphic mal ware detection. 
It has better accuracy than HMM and other well-known 
methods for metamorphic malware detection. In [20], a 
real world application has been designed for Javascript 
metamorphic detection based on OGS. In this paper, we 
proved that our method has better performance than 
OGS. It is plausible that our method is a practical 
solution for web-based metamorphic mal ware detection. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Metamorphic mal ware detection is a very 
challenging research area, which has gained much 
attention during previous years. In this study, we 
proposed a similarity method based on Opcode Graph 
Similarity and Linear Discriminant Analysis for 
metamorphic malware detection. Our approach 
overcomes weakness of OGS [4]. In state-of-the-art 
OGS, all nodes and edges contribute to the final result 
but in the proposed improved OGS, with the aid of 
LDA, junk edges are pruned from graphs. In other 
words, dead-code opcodes will be removed. Therefore, 
benign-benign and malware-malware similarity will 
increase and setting a threshold would be possible. The 
proposed method yielded 100% total accuracy for 
NGVCK and 99% accuracy for MWOR malware and 
proves that Improved OGS is highly efficient for 
metamorphic malware detection. 
Future work could include detailed examination on 
the parameters of the proposed approach. In addition, 
with regard to [19], it is possible that Improved OGS 
would have better accuracy for Javascript malware 
detection. Therefore, using our method for Javascript 
mal ware detection could leads to interesting result. 
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